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Abstract This paper focuses on the problem of real estate agentsʼ disloyalty to
their clients (buyers or sellers of houses) caused by asymmetric information, and
compares several previous studies in the US to this research on the effects of dual
agency deals in Japan. Dual agency means that the same real estate agent
represents both seller and buyer in a housing transaction. Furthermore, this paper
considers whether dual agency can be ethically accepted in housing transactions.
The important point is that dual agency distorts the sale price of houses, that is, it
causes information failure. Therefore, Japan should enact certain restrictions, such
as the US disclosure requirements of dual agency status, into law or into the ethical
codes of the real estate industry.
1. Introduction
Revitalization of the existing house market is a pressing issue in Japan. Vacant houses have
been increasing rapidly with the population decline in the worldʼs fastest aging country. In 2015,
26% of the population was over 65 and this figure is expected to reach 37% by 20501.
Approximately 8.2 million vacant houses existed in 2013, which is 14% of the total, that is, one
out of seven houses was empty (Figure 1). Moreover, vacancies are still increasing. It is an
urgent task for the government and society to reduce vacant houses causing external
diseconomies, such as blotting the landscape and lowering neighborsʼ property values. If owners
of vacant houses could sell them before causing trouble, the external diseconomies would be
alleviated to some degree. Real estate brokers, therefore, could play a crucial role in helping
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owners of vacant houses to sell them, thereby stimulating housing transactions. However, the
size of the existing house market is quite small in Japan, compared to other advanced countries;
the market share of existing houses was 14.7% in Japan, 83.1% in the US, 87.0% in the UK and 68.
4% in France (Figure 2). Why is it extremely low only in Japan? There could be multiple reasons,
for instance, the preference for quake-resistant new houses in earthquake country, the short
durable lifetime of wooden dwellings compared to Western stone-built houses, the preferential
taxation system for newly built houses, and the distrust of real estate brokers triggered by
asymmetric information issues.
This paper focuses on the problem of real estate agentsʼ disloyalty to their clients (buyers
or sellers) caused by asymmetric information, and introduces several previous studies from the
US which we compare to our research on the effects of dual agency deals in Japan. Dual agency
is the representation of both seller and buyer by the same agent in a housing transaction.
Furthermore, the paper questions whether accepting dual agency in housing transactions is
ethical.
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Figure 1. Number of Vacant Houses and Vacancy Rate in Japan
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Figure 2. Newly-Built Houses versus Existing Houses: International Comparison
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2. Information Failure in the Existing House Market
The asymmetric information problem in the existing house market can occur in two basic
situations. Firstly, it happens where buyers have less knowledge of the quality of the house than
sellers do; the problem of hidden characteristics and adverse selection. Secondly, it happens
when principals (buyers or sellers) are not able to monitor the agentsʼ behavior; the problem of
hidden actions and moral hazard.
In typical housing transactions, sellers have more information about the houses than buyers
do; the information contains not only the condition of the house that is visible or invisible on the
surface, but also transaction history such as the sale price of past transactions. In a market with
asymmetric information, the willingness to pay of buyers exposed to risk of purchasing “lemons”
could be low, and the sellers providing high-quality houses would withdraw from the market.
Only poor-quality houses are left, as a result, and the market would shrink. In the case of the
problem of hidden characteristics, real estate brokers with abundant experience and knowledge
of house trading are helpful to buyers worrying about unfair trades, and contribute to
preventing the market from being lemon-ized.
Intentionally hidden actions of real estate agents are a moral hazard, while the adverse
selection problem occurs without the will of the market participants.
Dual Agency versus Single Agency
In housing transactions, the term “dual agency” indicates that a real estate broker represents
both seller and buyer in the same transaction, which could cause a conflict of interest; the buyer
(seller) generally wants to buy (sell) the house at lowest (highest) price, but the dual-agent owes
a fiduciary duty to both principals in the same deal. On the other hand, “single agency” means
that an agent will represent the interests of either seller or buyer but not both clients in the
same transaction. In other words, the single-agent will represent only one side and have loyalty
to his client. This relationship between brokers and clients in real estate is one of the most
common in the US.
Even in single agency, however, real estate agents have the incentive to betray their clientʼs
benefit; the agents are more willing than their principals to accept undesirable price in order to
reduce trading time (Levitt and Syverson 2008; Rutherford et al. 2005, Hendel et al. 2008). In
addition, Kadiyali et al.(2014) indicates that dual agency further distorts the agentʼs incentives
and his behaviors in three ways. First, the agent has an incentive to steer buyers to his own
listings (sellers), or to steer sellers to his own buyers rather than alternative buyers (clients of
competing brokers) with willingness to pay higher prices. Second, the agent could disclose
confidential information to only one of his clients, either buyer or seller, helping one in either the
search or negotiation phase of the trading process. Third, to hasten the sale, the agent may
pressure the buyer (seller) to accept a higher (lower) price in the negotiation phase.
Therefore, allowing dual agency could distort the price mechanism in the market of
existing houses, and could incentivize the agent to breach his fiduciary duties; the agent tends to
stand by either buyer or seller depending on the situation2. The related problem has been
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arising recently in Japan; it is called “Kakoikomi” meaning that a sellerʼ s agent hides the
existence of other potential buyers (clients of competing agents) from sellers. For example,
when a competing agent for buyer A (offering the best value) contacts a sellerʼs agent, the sellerʼs
agent provides a false report, such as “the house is sold” or “it is under negotiation.” He then tries
to sell the house to his own buyer B (or tries to find another buyer, C, by himself) in order to earn
commissions from both buyer and seller from the same transaction, despite buyer B or Cʼs
offering price being lower than buyer Aʼ s. The “Building Lots and Buildings Transaction
Business Act” prohibits this “Kakoikomi,” but it is difficult for clients and regulatory
administration to monitor agentsʼ hidden actions.
3. Regulation and Ethics Code of Real Estate Industry Organization
In the US, state law limits dual agency deals in order to prevent real estate brokersʼ moral
hazard. That is, several states prohibit the dual agency deal while others permit it with several
types of restriction3. A few states, such as Colorado and Maryland, permit within-branch
(within-company) agency, in which two agents for both buyer and seller work at same branch
(at different branches of the same company), but prohibit dual agency where the same agent
represents both buyer and seller. This brokerage relationship is called designated agency.
However, in designated agency, two agents from the same company could patronize either
buyer or seller; therefore, this type of restriction does not seem effective enough for preventing
the moral hazard problem.
As mentioned above, the dual agent has incentives to represent one client to the exclusion
of the other, for example, giving confidential information to either buyer or seller, in order to be
certain to close a deal. However, if both clients know the dual agency status before agency
agreement or negotiation, it would be difficult for the agent to provide advantages to only one
side. Several states, such as Hawaii and New York, require dual agents to disclose the dual
agency status to both buyers and sellers. The type of disclosure requirement for dual agency
varies across states, for example, some states require that agents obtain written acknowledge-
ment of the dual agency status from clients, while other states only require a verbal disclosure.
Punitive nullification of operating licenses guarantees the effectiveness of the state law.
In addition to state law, the professional ethos of the US National Association of Realtors,
NAR, requires dual agency disclosure. This organization is one of the largest trade associations,
with approximately 1.2 million members, which the residential and commercial real estate
industry, belongs to, as of November 2017. The Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice of NAR
states “Realtors may represent the seller/landlord and buyer/tenant in the same transaction
only after full disclosure to and with informed consent of both parties (Standard of Practice
1-5).”
In Japan, on the other hand, the law prohibits real estate brokers from intentionally hiding
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2 Dual agency also has the benefit of efficient transactions; it could save time in matching buyers with sellers, and in
negotiating.
3 Olazabal (2003) explains various types of agency relationships in real estate precisely and extensively (see Appendix).
information related to the housing transaction from their clients, but there are no restrictions on
dual agency deals by law or any codes of ethics.
4. The Effect of Dual Agency on Housing Transactions
Gardiner et al. (2007) examined the effect of a law change in Hawaii. The State of Hawaii
mandated real estate brokers to disclose the fact of dual agency to both seller and buyer before
agency agreements in 1984. The study compared the housing transaction data of price and time,
pre-regulation (1,989 data in the period 1977-1980) and post-regulation (1,858 data in the period
1987-1989). They found that dual agency reduced the sale price, but the effect was much smaller
after the introduction of the new legislation (8.0% versus 1.4%). In addition, dual agency reduced
the time of the transactions by about 8.5 % pre-legislation and 8.1 % post-legislation.
Evans and Kolbe (2005) look at the dual agency effect on housing prices using the data of 4,
151 houses traded more than once during 1997-2003 in Memphis, Tennessee. They found that in
the first transaction, dual agency had no impact on price, but in the second, it had a negative
effect.
Kadiyali et al. (2014) conducted regression analysis, with the dependent variable being the
actual transaction price, using 10,888 datasets of houses traded during 2004-2007 in Long Island,
New York, and found that dual agency had no net effect on sale prices (Table1). They carried out
further regression analysis, adding list price as an independent variable, and explained the lack
of effect of dual agency on the sales price as the combination of two countervailing effects. The
first is agents exploiting information on internal buyer clientsʼ preferences and willingness to
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Table 1. A Comparison between Dual Agency and Single Agency Deals in Long Island, New York
Dual Agency Single Agency
Sales Price ($) 570,957 566,841
List Price ($) 603,003 591,381
Time-to-Sale (days) 82.0 84.2
# of Samples 5,247 5,641
Source: Kadiyali et al.(2014) p.178
Note: About half (48%) of all transactions occurred via dual agency; dual-agent
deals (26%), within-branch deals (19%), and within-agency deals (3%).
Table 2. The Relationship between Real Estate Brokers and Clients in Japan
(N=155)
Single agency only brokers 19.4%
Single/Dual agency brokers 64.5%
Dual agency only brokers 16.1%
Source: Shirakawa and Okoshi (2017)
Note: We class the groups of brokers by the levels of commission earned in one
transaction.
Single agency only broker: less than 3% of the sale price
Single/Dual agency brokers: 3% or more, but less than 6% of the sale price
Dual agency only brokers: 6% or more of the sales price
pay to help seller clients set a higher list price and ultimately obtain a higher sale price. The
second is agents favoring the buyer over the seller in the negotiation phase. New York only
permits dual agency when the agent makes full and complete disclosure to and obtains written
acknowledgement from both clients. This is also the case in several other states, such as Hawaii
mentioned above, and therefore the null effect seems to be a consequence of disclosure
regulation.
From the results of previous studies examining the influence of dual agency in the US, we
see that the difference in sale price between dual agency and single agency could disappear,
especially under sufficient disclosure. The disclosure rule could also work as a deterrent against
the agentʼs moral hazard.
The Case of Japan
In Japan, we have rarely conducted quantitative studies about the relationship between real
estate agents and clients and the behavior of housing market participants. Therefore, the
picture of the effect of dual agency is not clear. The crucial reason for the lack of studies is the
difficulty in gaining access to a comprehensive database of housing transactions, the likes of US
MLS4.
Our study (Shirakawa and Okoshi, 2017) attempted to analyze the effect of dual agency on
housing transactions in Japan employing the data of questionnaire research on real estate
brokersʼ behavior5. We calculated the share of real estate brokers introducing dual agency from
the questionnaire data and found that approximately 81% of brokers employed dual agency
deals. The share of single-agency-only companies was 19% (Table 2). This estimation indicates
that dual agency is the most common deal method in Japan.
We carried out regression analysis to examine the impact of dual agency on house prices,
the dependent variable was the average housing transaction price of each broker, and the
independent variables were group dummies as follows: the first is the “single-agency-only”
group, the second is the “single or dual agency” group, and the third is the “dual-agency-only”
group. Table 3 shows the result of the analysis; and we find that the coefficients of “single or dual
agency” and “dual-agency-only” are significantly negative. We can see that dual agency
significantly reduces the housing price in the existing house market in Japan. This result
indicates that dual agency could be a disadvantage for sellers in Japan where the population is
decreasing, however, the opposite is possible in growing areas where the dual-agent holds more
buyers than sellers as his own clients.
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4 Multiple Listing Service (MLS) is a service used by a group of real estate brokers, and it allows each of them to see one
another's listings of properties for sale. MLS creates an electronic database of the houses for sale and those sold before.
The database consists of abundant information about houses, such as owner, location, tax, characteristics, estimated
value, market conditions, mortgage history, foreclosure history, property map, neighbor details etc.
5 The Land Institute of Japan carried out a questionnaire survey of real estate brokers to find out whether the existing
house market had grounds for working healthily in Japan. One thousand questionnaires were mailed to real estate
brokers across the country during January-February of 2015, and 247 (24.7%) valid responses were recieved.
5. Conclusion
The price difference between dual and single agency disappears in the US where real estate
brokers employing dual agency deals are required to disclose dual agency status. On the other
hand, our research found that dual agency had the effect of reducing the sale price of houses in
Japan since there are no restrictions on dual agency that could hightlight the conflict of
interests.
Revitalization of the existing house market is a pressing issue in our country where we face
a decreasing population and an increase in vacant houses, and yet the size of the market is quite
small compared to other advanced countries. One of the reasons for the small market might be
the deep mistrust of real estate brokerages. The most common relationship between real estate
brokers and clients is dual agency, which would be an incentive for real estate agents to act
disloyally to their principals and bring disadvantage to either the house seller or buyer. The
question arises whether dual agency in housing transactions is ethically acceptable. Prohibiting
dual agency seems an excessive response, because it has the benefit of efficient transactions and
sometimes the market participants might only be interested in selling time. The important point
is that dual agency distorts market prices, that is, it causes information failure. We therefore
recommend the enactment into law or the ethical codes of Japanese real estate industry, certain
restrictions, such as the US disclosure requirements of dual agency status.
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Appendix. Classification of States by Realtor Roles, Default Position, and Other-Party Duties (Olazabal, 2003)
Alabama IV C 4 Montana IV A 3
Alaska I B 1 Nebraska I A 3
Arizona I B 3 Nevada II B 4
Arkansas I B 2 New Hampshire IV A 3
California I B 4 New Jersey IV A 3
Colorado IV A 3 New Mexico IV C 3
Connecticut II B 2 New York I B 4
Delaware I B 3 North Carolina II A 3
Florida IV B 3 North Dakota II A 3
Georgia IV A 3 Ohio II B 3
Hawaii I B 1 Oklahoma IV C 2
Idaho III A 4 Oregon II B 4
Illinois III B 3 Pennsylvania IV C 4
Indiana III A 3 Rhode Island I A 2
Iowa III A 4 South Carolina I A 2
Kansas IV A 3 South Dakota IV A 3
Kentucky IV B 2 Tennessee IV C 4
Louisiana III A 2 Texas II B 2
Maine II B 3 Utah I A 1
Maryland I A 3 Vermont I A 3
Massachusetts I B 2 Virginia II B 3
Michigan IV B 1 Washington II A 4
Minnesota IV B 3 West Virginia I B 4
Mississippi I B 3 Wisconsin III A 4
Missouri IV A 3 Wyoming IV A 3
Source: Olazabal (2003) p.132
Note:
Realtor Roles
Type I: recognize buyers' brokers
Type II: add designated agency
Type III: two-tiered service
Type IV: add transaction brokers
Realtor Roles
Class A: traditional model
Class B: “choice”/traditional model
Class C: transaction broker default
Other-Party Duties
Cat. 1: nonenumerated
Cat. 2: honesty/good faith
Cat. 3: disclose material adverse facts
Cat. 4: include reasonable care
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